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Abstract  
Purpose- This study aims to empirically explore corporate governance and the demographic traits 
of top management teams as the determinants of voluntary risk disclosure practices in listed banks. 
This study also aims to contribute to the existing risk disclosure literature by investigating the effect 
of a combination of determinants on voluntary risk disclosure practices in an emerging market. 
Furthermore, this study seeks to contribute to risk disclosure theories by employing the upper 
echelons theory to examine the determinants and their effects on voluntary risk disclosure practices.   
Design/Methodology/Approach- This investigation uses manual content analysis to measure the 
levels of risk disclosure in all Saudi listed banks from 2009 to 2013. It also uses ordinary least 
squares regressions analysis to examine the joint effect of corporate governance and demographic 
traits on risk disclosure.  
Results- The empirical findings show that external ownership, audit committee meetings, gender, 
size, profitability and board size are primary determinants of voluntary risk disclosure practices in 
Saudi listed banks. The remainder of the independent variables of both corporate governance 
mechanisms and demographic traits are insignificantly correlated with voluntary risk disclosure 
practices in Saudi listed banks. This study supports upper echelons theory and further 
encompasses demographic research into the risk disclosure field. 
Potential Implications- The empirical findings offer several important implications by reporting to 
banks’ stockholder, regulatory bodies and any other interested group on the importance of 
corporate governance and demographic determinants, which can be used to augment risk reporting 
in the banking industry. This study also backs upper echelons theory and encourages further 
demographic research into the risk disclosure field. 
Originality- To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, no prior research has been conducted on 
the determinants of risk disclosure in Saudi Arabian listed banks. Therefore, this is the first study 
to investigate the determinants of risk disclosure in the context of Saudi Arabia.   
Keywords- Banks, Saudi Arabia, Risk Disclosure Determinants, Upper Echelons Theory, Board 
Demography  
Paper Type- Research paper   
 
Introduction 
Regulatory institutions have had to reconsider the basis of banking regulations due to the global 
financial crisis. Beltratti and Stulz (2012) and Erkens et al. (2012) argued that this event resulted in 
serious concerns regarding risk disclosures. Due to this catastrophic corporate failure, investors’ 
and stakeholders’ attention has been drawn to the importance of risk reporting (Linsely et al., 2008). 
These concerns are coherent with the argument put forward by Meier et al. (1995), Schrand and 
Elliot (1998), Beretta and Bozzolan (2004), Cabedo and Tirado (2004), Ahmed et al. (2004), Linsley, 
Shrives and Crumpton (2006), Linsley and Shrives (2006), Abraham and Cox (2007), Linsley and 
Lawrence (2007) and Hassan (2009), which is that risk disclosure is a pivotal aspect of business 
risks, where reporting offers greater transparency and enhances investors’ confidence. As is 
evident, the global crisis also resulted in a deceleration of the global economy and thus the demand 
for risk reporting increased. This had led to a number of regulatory reforms, for example, the birth 
of the International Financial Reporting Standard 7 Financial Instruments and BASEL II, which 
includes greater measures on risk transparency and disclosure. It also emphasises the significance 
of informative risk disclosure in the banking industry for the overall enhancement of market 
discipline. The disclosure of informative risk information in banks has been cited as instrumental in 
eluding banking catastrophes (Financial Stability Board, 2012).   
Disclosure of financial risk information is important since it increases transparency, thus giving 
shareholders’ more confidence and lowering their uncertainty about future cash flow as well as 
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making it more viable for corporations to obtain external funding at a cost of capital, hence 
increasing capital market activities in general (Deumes, 1999; Easley and O’Hara, 2004; Kothari et 
al., 2009). Institutions are encouraged not only to report their activities but also the risks associated 
with them as well as their strategy for and capacity to manage these risks (ICAEW, 1999). 
However, prior research shows that financial statements suffer from serious deficiencies and 
inadequacies in terms of the provision of risk and uncertainty disclosures (Cabedo and Tirado, 
2004). One of the main causes of the global financial disaster in 2007 was the absence of adequate 
risk disclosure available to investors. This dearth of risk disclosure prohibited investors from having 
adequate appropriate information to evaluate corporations’ risk reportage (Rahman, 1998). 
Solomon et al. (2000) found that institutional investors consider risk reporting inadequate in the UK. 
Therefore, this leaves investors unable to adequately assess a firm’s risk profile, and hence they 
are unable to deliberate on the scale and categories of risk in their venture decisions (Linsley et al., 
2008). This dearth of risk information in annual reports indicates the necessity to examine the 
determinants of risk disclosure in different settings, particularly developing markets, such as in our 
case study, Saudi Arabia.    
Whilst previous literature discusses extensively the relationship between the determinants of risk 
disclosure in developed economies (Lajili and Zeghal, 2005; Linsely and Shrives, 2006; Abraham 
and Cox, 2007; Konishi and Ali, 2007; Deumes and Knechel, 2008; Hill and Short, 2009; Taylor, 
Tower and Neilson, 2010), there is very little mention of developing markets (Amran, Bin and 
Hassan, 2009; Hassan, 2009; Abdullah and Hassan, 2013). Furthermore, none of the preceding 
risk disclosure studies have investigated the impact of the joint effect of corporate governance and 
demographic variables on risk disclosure practices. This study aims to investigate risk disclosure 
practices in an emerging market, Saudi Arabia, empirically examining corporate governance and 
demographic traits as the determinants of risk reporting practices in Saudi listed banks. To the best 
of the researcher’s knowledge, this is the only study that has attempted to examine the joint effect 
of corporate governance and demographic traits on risk disclosure in emerging markets, and thus 
this research makes a novel contribution to the existing accounting literature. Furthermore, this 
study contributes to the risk disclosure literature by employing upper echelons theory in order to 
examine the determinants and their effects on risk disclosure practises. In addition, this is the only 
study that examines the demographic traits of the board of directors in a developing country. In 
particular, this study contributes to the board demography, governance and risk disclosure literature 
by theoretically justifying and empirically investigating the implications of such determinants and 
theories in regards to risk disclosure in the banking industry. This study is motivated, firstly, by the 
call made by Dobler et al. (2011) for more investigation into the influence of corporate governance 
determinants on risk disclosure, especially in developing markets and, secondly, by the call made 
by Abdullah, Hassan and McClelland, (2015) for more research into the relationship between 
demographic characteristics and risk disclosure.  
This study differs from Mousa and Elamir (2013), Mokhtar and Mellett (2013) and Abdullah, Hassan 
and McClelland (2015), who examined a single attribute of corporate governance characteristic 
and from Amran, Bin and Hassan (2009), Hassan, (2009), Abdullah and Hassan (2013) and Al-
Shammeri (2014), who did not investigate corporate governance and demographic attributes by 
comprehensively examining corporate risk disclosure and exploring demographic characteristics. 
Moreover, not a single study has examined corporate governance as a determinant of risk 
disclosure in the Saudi context. Also, not one of the above-mentioned studies explored the 
demographic traits of a top management team in emerging markets. This investigation differs from 
all of the above-mentioned studies in that it examines the demographic characteristics of the top 
board of directors, employing upper echelons theory to examine risk reporting practices in the 
banking industry. Furthermore, this study differs from Amran, Bin and Hassan, (2009), Hassan, 
(2009), Abdullah and Hassan, (2013), Mousa and Elmir, (2013), Mokhtar and Mellett, (2013), Al-
Shammeri, (2014) and Abdullah, Hassan and McClelland (2015) by being the first to examine risk 
disclosure over a period of five years in a developing economy.  
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The empirical findings show that large banks with high outsider ownership, high profitability, high 
regularity of audit committee meetings and gender are more likely to demonstrate higher levels of 
risk disclosure practices. Also, risk disclosure is negatively affected by board size. Moreover, as 
can be seen from our empirical findings, external ownership, audit committee meetings, gender, 
size, profitability and board size are primary determinants of risk disclosure practices in Saudi listed 
banks, while the rest of the independent variables of both corporate governance mechanisms and 
demographic traits are insignificantly correlated with risk disclosure practices in Saudi listed bank. 
Our findings have several important implications for banks stockholder, regulatory bodies and any 
other interested group on the importance of corporate governance and demographic determinants, 
which can be used to augment risk reporting in the banking industry. This study also supports upper 
echelons theory and further encompasses demographic research into the risk disclosure field. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: section 2 discusses the theoretical framework; 
section 3 develops the hypotheses; section 4 outlines the research design and methodology; 
section 5 discusses empirical analysis; section 6 is the discussion; and section 7 offers conclusions.   
Corporate Governance and Banking  
It has been argued that compared with other industries, the banking industry is the industry which 
has the highest requirements for corporate governance and disclosure regulations. As such 
industry is a financial intermediary body which is an important part in every country’s economy and 
has a major role in the financial system of that country (Khaled, 2008). Furthermore, the banking 
industry is based on trust, however banks as financial entities deal with all kinds of risks on a daily 
bases since it is a part of their business (Barakat and Hussainey, 2013). Therefore, to keep public 
confidence and decrease risks, Saudi banks need to have good financial performance and 
demonstrate corporate governance best practice. Such behaviour is greatly important for 
shareholders when considering investment decision makings.      
Theoretical framework 
Corporate governance has been defined by Solomon and Solomon (2004: 14) as “the system of 
checks and balances, both internal and external to companies, which ensures that companies 
discharge their accountability to all stakeholders and act in a socially responsible way in all areas 
of their business activities”. Also, Sharman and Copnell, (2002) defined corporate governance as 
“the system and process by which entities are directed and controlled to enhance performance and 
sustainable shareholder value, and it is concerned with the effectiveness of management structure, 
the sufficiency and reliability of corporate reporting and the effectiveness of risk management 
systems”.    
The literature has established a robust relationship between disclosure and corporate governance. 
The FRC (2008) affirmed that management effectiveness, firm performance and shareholder value 
is supported by the combined code on corporate governance, which also promotes certainty in 
corporate disclosure and governance. Mallin (2002: 253) stated that “corporate governance codes 
and their recommendations undoubtedly contribute towards increased transparency and 
disclosure”. Previous studies by Solomon et al. (2000) and Solomon and Solomon (2004) have 
also contributed to the relationship between corporate governance and risk disclosure.  
 
In concordance with various theoretical debates (i.e. agency theory regards corporate governance 
as a control mechanism), the literature has generally reported a link between reporting and 
corporate governance (Ho and Wang, 2001; Elshandidy and Neri, 2015). For instance, the impact 
of corporate governance attributes on disclosure exercises has proven to diminish information 
asymmetries and enhance the functionality of organisational stewardship. Furthermore, the 
precision of risk information is used as an external control mechanism, which lessens agency costs 
and is of great importance to all interested groups (investors and analysts). This provides all 
interested groups with the functionality to formulate precise investment decisions and evaluate 
institutions’ risk profiles effectively (Elshandidy and Neri, 2015; Campbell et al., 2014; Kravet and 
Muslu, 2013; Miihkinen, 2013).  
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The theoretical association between corporate governance and disclosure has mainly been 
examined through information asymmetry (signalling theory) and agency theory. In the case of 
future disclosure examinations, the literature has proposed the employment of agency and 
signalling theories to examine the links between disclosure and managerial incentives (Core, 2001; 
Beyer et al., 2010). Moreover, corporate governance mechanisms have been recognised as 
controlling agency problems and guaranteeing that directors’ actions are in the best interest of 
shareholders (Ho and Wong, 2001). 
 Agency theory explains the disagreements between directors and shareholders when directors’ 
interests differ from those of shareholders. However, it has been established by a number of prior 
investigations that various monitoring mechanisms, such as audit committees, independent 
external auditing and well-timed financial reviews (Deumes and Knechel, 2008; Spira and Page, 
2003) are able to mitigate agency problems since they provide top management with more reliable 
information for financial reporting purposes. Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that monitoring 
plays a central part in controlling the conduct of directors. Healy and Palepu (2001) proposed four 
resolutions for agency problems, the second of which includes corporate governance, with an 
emphasis on the board of directors’ responsibility to monitor and discipline management in the best 
interest of outside owners.  
Information asymmetry conflicts (also underpinned by signalling theory) between internal directors 
and external investors could extend to internal control systems in the case of corporate governance 
(Akerlof, 1970; Spence, 1973). Accordingly, outsiders cannot observe internal control activity and 
conduct in some circumstances due to the lack of regulations and guidance on internal control 
activity and conduct. Therefore, shareholders tend not to have a full understanding of the nature 
and scope of internal control systems. This leads to shareholders having difficulty appreciating 
managers’ efforts to counter risks.  Yet, managers could reduce information asymmetries by using 
their discretion to provide more information on internal control and risk management, potentially 
benefitting analysts, investors and other market users (Lajili and Zeghal, 2005; Deumes and 
Knechel, 2008). 
It has been noticed from prior literature that agency theory and information asymmetry, both of 
which underpin signalling theory, are deployed to explicate risk disclosure to investors (Abraham 
and Cox, 2007; Lopes and Rodrigues, 2007; Vandemaele et al., 2009; Elshandidy et al., 2013). 
When internal management decides to disclose risk information to decrease agency conflicts, this 
culminates in mitigating information asymmetries between both parties.  However, internal 
management might sometimes choose to release some risk information to signal their competence 
and capability to handle risks to distinguish themselves from the rest, which might translate into an 
improved reputation and some monetary gain.  In addition to formulating this paper’s hypotheses, 
the following section discusses a number of corporate governance attributes and their potential 
impact on risk disclosure practices.  
 
Corporate governance studies investigate the relationship between corporate governance 
attributes and corporate performance. This investigation concentrates on the impact of corporate 
governance attributes on risk disclosure. Whilst a number of studies have looked into the effect of 
corporate governance on disclosure in developed countries, the impact of corporate governance 
on risk disclosure in developing markets has received scant attention. Thereafter, this research will 
try to address this gap and contribute to the literature by examining the effect of corporate 
governance attributes on risk disclosure practices in Saudi Arabia.  
 
The Upper Echelons Theory  
In pioneering work by Hambrick and Mason (1984), the two concepts of the dominant coalition and 
demographic research were combined. The authors suggested that certain organizational effects 
are linked to top management teams having specific demographic profiles. Moreover, upper 
echelons theory proposes that the characteristics of top management, in particular demographic 
characteristics, might affect strategic decision-makings and hence performance. At the centre of 
this theory is the notion that the background knowledge and values of corporate directors impact 
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upon the essential strategic decisions made by these central corporate managers. Hambrick and 
Mason also claimed that observable attributes, e.g. age, practical experience and tenure, could 
function as practical proxies for the cognitive base that directs top directors’ decisions. Moreover, 
upper echelons theory is categorized according to several important elements. As highlighted by 
Hambrick and Mason (1984), demographic features influence strategic decision making and 
performance. Thus, in this study the concept is extended to the determinants of risk disclosure, 
investigating whether such features of the top board could impact upon the determinants of risk 
reportage in the banking sector.  
 
Figure: 1 The Upper echelons model  
 
Above is the adapted upper echelons framework, which is based on three fundamental principles: 
first, the strategic choices taken by institutions (the representations of the cognitive bases and 
values of the dominant players, the top board members); second, the cognitive bases and values 
of such players (the ramifications of their observable characteristics, such as functional trucks and 
education); and third, significant institutional consequences that are related to the observable 
characteristics of such players.  In fact, this theory proposes that institutional performance is only 
a representation of its top board directors. However, the fourth dimension (disclosure) added to the 
above framework can be directly influenced by upper echelons theory characteristics or indirectly 
by the ramifications of the overall performance of the company, where sometimes risk disclosure 
would mean survival for an institution. This model also plays a vital part in determining key 
institutional effects, such as the provision of risk disclosure. It also grants us the opportunity to 
investigate the core determinants of board demography in relation to risk disclosure.   
 
This theory implies that certain organizational effects are linked to top management teams having 
specific demographic profiles. Moreover, upper echelons theory proposes that the characteristics 
of top management, in particular demographic characteristics, might affect strategic decision-
makings and hence performance. At the centre of this theory is the notion that the background 
knowledge and values of corporate directors impact upon the essential strategic decisions made 
by these central corporate managers. Moreover, this theory incorporates several important 
elements such as the demographic features, strategic decision making and performance. Thus, in 
this study the concept is extended to the determinants of risk disclosure, investigating whether such 
features of the top board could impact upon the determinants of risk reportage in the banking sector.  
Such demographic traits play an important role in determining key institutional effects, such as the 
provision of risk disclosure in the annual reports. This theory will also assist this investigation in 
interpreting the findings of the current study’s second question to identify what determines risk 
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information in the annual reports. This theory will also be employed for reinforcing the results to the 
second research question. It also grants this study the opportunity to investigate the core 
determinants of board demography in relation to risk disclosure.   
 
This theory has only been used in fields other than disclosure. For example, Peterson et al. (2003) 
deployed upper echelons theory when examining the determinants of organisational performance, 
while Tihanyi et al. (2000) used it when exploring the effects of firm international diversification and 
Mutuku et al. (2008) employed it when studying the quality of decisions and performance. To the 
best of the researcher’s knowledge, no prior research has investigated disclosure in relation to 
upper echelons theory. Hence, this is the first study to extend the employment of upper echelons 
theory into the area of disclosure.   
    
Literature 
While many studies have examined the individual characteristics of corporate governance, such as 
ownership structure and independent outside directors (Mohobbot, 2005; Konishi and Ali, 2007; 
Deumes and Knechel, 2008; Hill and Short, 2009; Taylor, Tower and Neilson, 2010), only a few 
have explored corporate governance characteristics in developed countries (Abraham and Cox, 
2007; Oliveira, Rodrigues and Craig, 2011b; Elzahar and Hussainey, 2012), Apart from Mousa and 
Elamir (2013), Mokhtar and Mellett (2013) and Abdullah, Hassan and McClelland (2015), who 
examined a single attribute of corporate governance characteristics, percentage of foreign 
ownership, duality and board size, the literature on developing economies has not explored 
comprehensively corporate governance characteristics (Amran, Bin and Hassan, 2009; Hassan, 
2009; Abdullah and Hassan, 2013; Al-Shammeri, 2014). Furthermore, not a single study has 
examined corporate governance as a determinant of risk disclosure in the Saudi context in 
particular. Therefore, this is the first study that focuses on the Saudi market in that domain. In 
addition, the current study is the only one that explores corporate governance characteristics and 
risk disclosure in the GCC market since the previous literature focused on firm-specific 
characteristics.  
 
Furthermore, whilst a small number of studies have examined risk disclosure over more than a one 
year period in developed economies (Cabedo and Tirado, 2004; Deumes, 2008; Deumes and 
Knechel, 2008; Rajab and Schachler, 2009; Hill and Short, 2009; Taylor, Tower and Neilson, 2010; 
Elshandidy, Fraser and Hussainey, 2015), none have examined risk disclosure over more than a 
one year period in developing economies (Amran, Bin and Hassan, 2009; Hassan, 2009; Abdullah 
and Hassan, 2013; Mousa and Elmir, 2013; Al-Shammeri, 2014; Abdullah, Hassan and McClelland, 
2015). Therefore, the current study is the only study that examines risk disclosure over a period of 
five years in developing economies.  
 
While nonfinancial and mixed institutions in developed countries have been widely researched and 
reported upon in the literature (Carlon, Loftus and Miller, 2003; Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004; Linsley 
and Shrives, 2005; Lajili and Zeghal, 2005; Combes-Thuelin, Henneron and Touron, 2006; 
Abraham and Cox, 2007; Deumes and Knechel, 2008; Hill and Short, 2009; Taylor, Tower and 
Neilson, 2010; Oliveira, Rodrigues and Craig, 2011b; Dobler, Lajili and Zeghal, 2011; Elzahar and 
Hussainey, 2012; Elshandidy, Fraser and Hussainey, 2015), only a few studies have focused on 
financial institutions in developed countries (Solomon, Solomon and Norton, 2000; Linsley, Shrives 
and Crumpton, 2006; Oliveira, Rodrigues and Craig, 2011a; Maffei et al., 2014) and no 
investigations have been conducted on financial institutions in developing markets (Amran, Bin and 
Hassan, 2009; Hassan, 2009; Abdullah and Hassan, 2013; Mousa and Elmir 2013; Al-Shammeri, 
2014; Abdullah, Hassan and McClelland, 2015). Therefore, this is the only study that investigates 
financial institutions in developing economies, particularly Saudi Arabia. Also none of the above 
studies have examined the demographic attributes of top management teams nor have they 
employed upper echelons theory in examining the nature and determinates of risk disclosure. 
Therefore, this is the only study that examines the demographic traits of the top boards in 
developing countries. This is a response to the call for more research into the relationship between 
the demographic characteristics and risk disclosure made by Abdullah, Hassan and McClelland 
(2015). Based on the developing and appropriate preceding literature on disclosure and risk 
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disclosure in relation to corporate governance, a number of corporate governance attributes will be 
presented along with their potential impact on risk disclosure practices. This paper’s hypotheses 
will thus be formulated. 
 
Hypotheses development 
Ownership Structure 
Corporate governance and financial reporting have been markedly affected by ownership structure 
and corporate culture (Beattie et al., 2001). It has been argued that ownership and governance 
(which constitute the board of directors) could affect companies’ risk reporting since the directors 
compose the yearly reports for shareholders (Abraham and Cox, 2007). Moreover, when reviewing 
the literature for the purpose of conducting this investigation, it was noticed that a variety of proxies 
have been applied to the ownership structure variable. These are: ownership concentration; 
institutional ownership; the number of shareholders; government ownership; the proportion of 
shares owned by outsiders; family ownership; managerial ownership; the percentage of closely 
held shares (CHS); foreign ownership and the NOSH-Factor, which combines the free-float shares; 
the percentage of total share available to the ordinary investor; total strategic holdings; and 
investment-company held shares. However, empirical research has discovered a mixture of 
outcomes in this regard, which might be explained by the dissimilarity between the employment 
measurement and the ownership factor.  
 
As a consequence, Fama and Jensen (1983) stated that modern establishments are distinguished 
by the detachment of ownership from control i.e. detaching management decisions from monitoring 
decisions.  Additionally, Cooke (1989b, p.177) stated, “Where there is a divorce of ownership from 
control, the potential for agency costs exists because of conflict between, firstly, shareholders and 
managers and, secondly, bondholders and shareholder-managers”. Owusu-Ansah (1998) 
confirmed that ownership structure and disclosure connection is explained by agency theory since 
modern corporations are distinguished by the detachment of ownership from control. 
 
On the one hand, corporations with dispersed public ownership of securities will be inclined to have 
high agency costs, whereby stockholders can pressurize management for more information as part 
of the monitoring activity. On the other hand, in the event of concentrated ownership, there is little 
or no physical segregation between owners and managers of the capital and most of the risk related 
information can be exchanged at boardroom meetings or in a casual manner. Hence, less risk 
related information will be accessible to the public (Mohobbot, 2005).  
 
Furthermore, information asymmetry can also be related to the discussion on the effect of 
ownership structure on financial reporting. Concentrated ownership companies may not encounter 
a high level of information asymmetry via augmented exposure, and these companies are not as 
easily able to comply with public reportage since most of the information is communicated at 
meetings and other informal manners (Mohobbot, 2005). What’s more, Owusu-Ansah (1998) 
claimed that when there is extensively distributed ownership, individual shareholders are not in a 
strong position to influence company disclosure policies and practices owing to not having the 
power to access the firm’s internal information. Conversely, Hossain, Tan and Adams (1994) posit 
that discretionary reporting tends to be more common in extensively held companies in order for 
directors to efficiently oversee managers so as to optimize the firm’s financial interests and ensure 
that they are operating in the best interests of the owners.   Nevertheless, Kothari (2000) stated 
that the ownership distribution pattern and dispersed managerial ownership foster the demand for 
reporting to be high. However, Mohobbot (2005) argued that in the case of concentrated ownership 
concentration, most of the risk related information could be exchanged at the boardroom meeting 
or by any other casual manner, which will result in less risk related information being available to 
the market. Thus, there may be a negative relationship between risk disclosure and the number of 
shareholders. What’s more, Wallace and Nasser (1995) argued that the more people who demand 
to know about the activities of a company, the more comprehensive the reporting of the company. 
The authors also proposed that the boost in risk reporting could solve supervising difficulties related 
to growth in the proportion of the company owned by outsiders.  
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Konishi and Ali (2007) established that there was an insignificant correlation between the ownership 
diffusion pattern and the number of risk disclosures. However, the researchers still felt that there 
was an association between the two variables. They explained that managers could hold a high 
proportion of stocks and choose not to report all risk related information. Konishi and Ali (2007) 
confirmed that risk reporting policy is controlled by the board of directors or the top management 
team, implying that there can be no risk disclosure without their involvement. In addition, Deumes 
and Knechel (2008) discovered a negative relationship between internal control disclosures and 
both ownership concentration and managerial ownership. The authors suggested that this could 
indicate that there are monetary reasons why corporate managers voluntarily disclose more/less 
information on internal control and that corporate managers evaluate the disclosure’s costs and 
advantages then only disclose if the advantages outweigh the costs. 
  
In spite of this, The Office of Fair Trading (2009) argued that government ownership can influence 
markets through immediate participation, for example, as market makers or as suppliers and buyers 
of goods and services or by indirect participation in private markets via taxation, regulations and 
subsidies. Moreover, Owusu-Ansah (1998) claimed that government ownership could lead to 
unusual access to corporations’ information so as to monitor their investment actions, making them 
less motivated to increase public disclosure.   
 
Konishi and Ali (2007) acknowledged that the aim of those corporations’ disclosure strategies is to 
respond to the disparities in the demand for public exposure encountered. They also argued that 
where the government owns the majority of shares, risk reportage would be lower than when 
ownership is dispersed. This is due to the increased pressure on corporate managers to report 
more risk related information. However, Cooke (1998) documented an insignificant relationship 
between government ownership and disclosure.   
 
Nonetheless, Mohobbot (2005) contended that if the number of foreign investors is high, there is 
more pressure on corporate managers to report higher numbers of risk related disclosures.  
Furthermore, Mangena and Tauringana (2007) reported a positive relationship between disclosure 
and foreign holdings, whereas Konishi and Ali (2007) documented an insignificant relationship 
between the two variables.  
 
In the case of institutional holdings, Hassan (2008) affirmed that company directors respond to 
demands from institutional environments by adjusting some practices, such as the reportage of risk 
related information, so as to acquire social legitimacy. Additionally, Taylor (2011) stated that 
institutional stockholders are expected to reduce asymmetrical information by performing an 
overseeing role due to close contacts with the management of organizations as well as preventing 
management from withdrawing risk information. However, Solomon, Solomon and Norton (2000) 
reported that institutional stockholders in the UK acknowledged that expanded corporate risk 
disclosure would aid their portfolio investment decision-making, yet they did not support a regulated 
setting for risk disclosure or any general statement on business risk.  Furthermore, Abraham and 
Cox (2007) discovered that there was a negative relationship between risk disclosure and long-
term institutional investors in the UK, whereas they found a positive correlation with short-term 
investors. However, Taylor (2011) reported that there was no significant association between long-
term institutional shareholders and disclosure in Australia. He also discovered a positive correlation 
between short-term institutional shareholders and risk reportage.  
 
Elshandidy et al. (2013) documented a positive significant correlation between ownership structure 
(proxied by CHS and NOSH-Factor) and risk disclosure. In addition, some empirical research 
results have revealed that institutions with lower insider ownership (proxied by CHS) are prone to 
higher risk disclosure (Elshandidy et al., 2013; Marshall and Weetman, 2007; Gelb, 2000). Also, 
institutions with higher outsider ownership (proxied by NOSH-Factor) are prone to considerably 
higher levels of risk disclosure (Elshandidy et al., 2013; Deumes and Knechel, 2008; Abraham and 
Cox, 2007).  Therefore, the following hypotheses were formulated: 
 
H1: There is a negative relationship between risk disclosure and insider ownership. 
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H2: There is a positive relationship between risk disclosure and outsider ownership. 
 
Board Size  
To date, there have been few specific investigations into the relationship between board size and 
risk disclosure. However, a number of researchers have examined board size in the context of 
voluntary disclosure. Furthermore, Cheng and Courtenay (2006) claimed that there is no 
consensus regarding a connection between the level of voluntary exposure and board size and that 
it remains an empirical issue. The same could be said for the relationship between board size and 
risk disclosure. Moreover, Chen and Jaggi (2000) argued that a large number of directors on the 
board could lessen the information asymmetry issue and instigate more disclosure. Also, Healy 
and Palepu (2001) confirmed that the number of directors on the board could affect its control and 
monitoring operations, though disclosure is regarded as a monitoring item that could be increased. 
 
Conversely, Cheng and Courtenay (2006) agreed that the more directors on the board the less 
efficient it would be at monitoring management. According to agency theory, bigger boards are bad 
and corrupt, while smaller boards are good and effective in terms of enhancing performance and 
disclosure (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Free rider problems between executives, expanded 
decision making time, raised costs, poor communication and monitoring could all have an adverse 
effect on disclosure levels and good practice (Jensen, 1993). However, several recent studies have 
associated large boards with greater risk disclosure (Allegrini and Greco, 2013; Elshandidy et al., 
2013; Ntim et al., 2013; Elshandidy and Neri, 2015) 
 
All in all, the empirical findings on this issue have been mixed.  Ntim et al. (2013), Elshandidy et al. 
(2013), Allegrini and Greco (2013) and Elshandidy and Neri (2015) all found a positive relationship 
between the number of directors on the board and risk disclosure. In addition, Abeysekera (2010) 
discovered that there was a positive connection between discourse and board size in Kenya. 
However, Cheng and Courtenay (2006) established that there was no significant association 
between the two variables, while Jia et al. (2009) Guest (2009) and Coles et al. (2008) documented 
a negative relationship between board size and disclosure and performance. Therefore, the 
following hypothesis was formulated:  
H3: There is a positive relationship between risk disclosure and board size. 
 
Independent Directors 
It has been claimed by agency theorists that the board of directors acts as a shield and plays a 
substantial part in corporate governance in terms of decision control and the monitoring of 
operations (Cheng et al., 2006). However, Ho and Wong (2001) contented that agency theory does 
not assume that all groups on the board of directors enhance accountability and extend disclosure. 
There is a mixture of corporate insiders and outsiders on the board, all of whom may have 
distinctive views on disclosure. The outsiders (independent directors) act as a measure of corporate 
governance quality and are more likely to minimize agency problems and lower the demand for 
regulatory intervention in corporate disclosure (Abraham and Cox, 2007).  Accordingly, Lopes and 
Rodrigues (2007) claimed that more independent directors are required on boards of directors to 
control and monitor the operations of managers and that this leads to more disclosure from 
corporations.   
 
However, the empirical findings on independent directors and risk disclosure are diverse. Abraham 
and Cox (2007) and Elshandidy et al. (2013) confirmed that there was a positive correlation 
between independent directors and risk disclosure, whereas Lopes and Rodrigues (2007) found 
no significant relationship between risk disclosure and independent directors. Therefore, the 
following hypothesis was formulated:  
H4:  There is a positive relationship between risk disclosure and independent directors. 
 
Non-executive Directors 
The empirical findings on the influence of non-executive directors on disclosure practices have 
been mixed. Fama and Jensen (1983) claimed that the existence of non-executive directors on the 
board could result in the reduction of agency conflicts among owners and managers. Moreover, 
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Barako et al. (2006) argued that non-executive directors are regarded by investors and 
stockholders as a fundamental control and monitoring element of corporate governance, delivering 
the indispensable checks and balances required to improve board effectiveness. Also, Haniffa and 
Cooke (2002) affirmed that non-executive directors are considered to be the control, check and 
balance mechanism that increases board effectiveness. However, Ho and Wong (2001) contented 
that agency theory does not assume that all groups on the board of directors enhance 
accountability and extend disclosure. 
 
In opposition, Abraham and Cox (2007) claimed that an increased number of non-executive 
directors on the board makes it more likely that stockholders’ preferences on accountability and 
transparency are met.  Furthermore, the authors argued that the findings illustrated that the 
combination of boards plays a substantial part in the transmission of risk related disclosures to 
shareholders and different groups of directors. As a result, more reportage is predicted if the non-
executive directors are in fact performing their monitoring job rather than their perceived-monitoring 
job, putting pressure on management to release more information (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Eng 
and Mac, 2003). 
 
Berry (2008) confirmed that in his roles as a non-executive director of a number of UK corporations 
he had endeavored to contribute to the expansion of efficient risk management as well as 
attempting to clarify the key risks to the board. He also argued that not all non-executive directors 
are independent and that dependent non-executive directors could have contacts with 
management which would call to question their role in monitoring, controlling and increasing 
disclosure levels.  
 
Empirical investigations by Abraham and Cox (2007) and Deumes and Knechel (2008) found that 
there was no significant relationship between non-executive directors and risk disclosure, whereas, 
Eng and Mac (2003) and Elshandidy et al. (2013) reported a positive relationship between non-
executive directors and risk disclosure. Based on this discussion the following hypothesis was 
formulated:   
H5: There is a positive relationship between risk disclosure and non-executive directors. 
 
Audit Committee Independence 
It has been argued that limited research has attempted to examine the link between disclosure and 
the features of audit committees (Albitar, 2015). As a part of the internal control system and 
corporate governance, corporations assign audit committees. Audit committee members have to 
work on behalf of the board of directors and for the benefit of investors.  Moreover, Barako et al. 
(2006) explained that the audit committee can play a supervisory role, which would lead to an 
enhanced quality of information flowing between stockholders and directors, particularly in the 
event of financial reporting wherein the two parties hold unequal levels of information. Similarly, 
Forker (1992) stated that an audit committee can act as an efficient monitoring mechanism that 
minimizes agency costs and augments disclosure. In addition, Ho and Wong (2001) claimed that 
because audit committees contain predominantly non-executive managers, they have the power to 
moderate the amount of information withheld. Audit committees play possibly important part to in 
ensuring sound corporate governance (Avison and Cowton, 2012)  
 
Furthermore, Taylor (2011) argued that the agency theory argument suggests that the more 
independent the audit committee is from upper administration, the more probable it is to act in the 
best interests of the firm’s investors in terms of decreasing information asymmetry. The researcher 
also acknowledged that audit committees have two main responsibilities, firstly, to make sure that 
risks are coped with and internal controls exist to protect against risks and secondly, to ensure that 
corporate statements are examined to guarantee the integrity of financial and other investor related 
disclosures for shareholders.  
 
Nevertheless, the empirical findings on disclosure and audit committee independence have been 
mixed. Taylor (2011) and Oliveira et al. (2011b) reported a positive association between audit 
committee independence and risk disclosure. However, they also reported an insignificant 
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association between risk disclosure and the financial expertise of audit committee members. 
Furthermore, Neri (2010) found an insignificant relationship between these two variables. Therefore, 
the following hypothesis was formulated:   
H6: There is a positive relationship between risk disclosure and the independence of audit 
committee. 
 
Audit committee size: 
As previously stated, a part of the internal control system and corporate governance corporations 
assign audit committees. This concept was first proposed and examined by Forker (1992). He 
stated that an audit committee can act as an efficient monitoring mechanism that can minimize 
agency costs and augment disclosure. Moreover, Ho and Wong (2001) claimed that the presence 
of an audit committee significantly affects the extent of disclosure. Also, the authors claimed that 
because audit committees contain predominantly non-executive managers, they have the power to 
moderate the amount of information withheld. Moreover, Chen and Jaggi (2000) argued that a large 
number of directors on the committee could lessen the information asymmetry issue and lead to 
more disclosure.  Prior empirical research has indicated a positive relationship between disclosure 
and audit committee size (Barako et al., 2006). Therefore, the following hypothesis was formulated:    
H7: There is a positive relationship between audit committee size and risk disclosure  
 
Audit committee meetings  
Previous literature has offered pragmatic evidence on the advantages of directors meticulously 
controlling disclosure, with the number of meetings being a key aspect of this control (Alegrini and 
Greco, 2013). Karamanou and Valeas (2005) claimed that regular meetings have a fundamental 
impact on audit committee effectiveness. It has also been argued that regular audit committee 
meetings are more likely to lead to compliance with responsibilities and the monitoring of financial 
reporting (to improve the quality of information that flows between stockholders and directors, 
where the two parties hold unequal levels of information (Barako et al., 2006)). In addition, Chen et 
al. (2006) affirmed that meeting more regularly decreases the risk of fraud. Karamanou and Vafeas 
(2005) documented a positive relationship between the regularity of audit committee meetings and 
the probability of making earnings forecasts, thus leading to greater disclosure. Also, Allegrini and 
Greco (2013) reported a positive link between the regularity of audit committee meetings and 
disclosure. Therefore, the following hypothesis was formulated:       
H8: There is a positive correlation between the number of meetings of the audit committee and risk 
disclosure. 
 
Demographic Variables  
There have been a number of examinations of the relationship between the attributes of top 
organizational managers and various organizational effects (Michel and Hambrick, 1992; Bantel, 
1993; Walt and Ingley, 2003; Kang et al., 2007; Mutuku et al., 2008; Adams and Ferreira, 2009). 
Two essential theoretical advances in the area of organizational research are key. Firstly, Cyert 
and March (1963) developed the concept of the dominant coalition, which shifts the focus from the 
individual CEO to the whole team of the board of directors in terms of organizational leadership. 
The second concept is the increased emphasis on utilizing observable demographic characteristics, 
such as age, gender, tenure and experience in organizational studies and investigating the link 
between these attributes and organizational consequences (Pfeffer, 1983; Tehanyi et al., 2000; 
Mutuku et al., 2008) 
 
In groundbreaking work by Hambrick and Mason (1984), these two concepts, namely the dominant 
coalition and demographic research, were combined. The authors suggested that certain 
organizational effects are linked to top management teams having specific demographic profiles. 
Moreover, upper echelon theory proposes that top management characteristics, in particular their 
demographic characteristics, could impair strategic decision making. At the centre of this theory is 
the idea that background knowledge and the values of corporate directors impact upon essential 
strategic decisions made and acted upon by these central corporate managers. Hambrick and 
Mason also claimed that observable attributes, for example, age, practical experience and tenure, 
could function as practical proxies for the cognitive base that guides top directors’ decisions.  
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However, a number of academic researchers have criticized the demographic approach (Pettigrew, 
1992; Lawrence, 1997; Aldrich, 1979). Therefore, the main concern is the necessity to access the 
“black box” that might contain the operative mechanism connecting demographic characteristics to 
organizational aftermath consequences (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996). Pettigrew (1992: 178) 
claimed that little is known about “the processes by which top teams go about their tasks”. Lawrence 
(1997) illustrated that demographic variables are sometimes employed as representatives for 
subjective concepts. The author noticed that investigators depending on the demographic 
approach make a congruence assumption via which demographic variables are employed to 
represent subjective concepts without offering a logical justification for why this is a valid approach.  
 
Yet, studies investigating team demography and processes have offered important insights into the 
reported “black box”. For instance, Smith et al. (1994), Tehanyi et al. (2000) and Mutuku et al. 
(2008) reported that top management team demography was indirectly associated with 
performance via intervening process variables incorporating social integration and communication. 
Meanwhile, Pelled, Eisenhardt and Xin (1999), Walt and Ingley (2003), Kang et al. (2007) and 
Adams and Ferreira (2009) reported that team demography diversity can lead to disagreement, 
which can affect group performance, which in turn affects all aspects of organizational decision-
making and outcomes.  In addition, some of these investigators found that these associations were 
further controlled by task routines and group longevity.  
 
Limitations are inherent in any approach. However, a strand of literature that depends 
predominantly on top management team demographic variables has produced important findings. 
These investigations mostly concentrated on two dimensions of team composition. Firstly, they 
focused on the impact of demographic attributes on the consequences of organizational decisions 
based upon the notion that particular demographic attributes are connected with top management 
perceptions, which eventually lead to certain actions and consequences. Some of these 
investigations recognized a significant link between top management team demographic traits and 
corporate strategies (Wiersema and Bantel, 1992; Bantel, 1993; Mutuku et al., 2008; Adams and 
Ferreira, 2009; Nielsen and Huse, 2010; Ellwood and Gracia-Lacalle, 2015; Allini et al., 2015).  
 
All in all, the dependence on the demographic approach still appears to be justified (Finkelstein and 
Hambrick, 1996). Lawrence (1997) also demonstrated that demographic variables have important 
qualities, offering high content validity and replicability in a domain where replication is all too rare.  
In addition, Pfeffer (1983) recommended the employment of observable managerial traits as a 
means of addressing the shortcomings of subjective studies, which sometimes incorporate 
measurement error, differences in conceptualizations and low levels of explained variance. This is 
also reflected in Finkelstein and Hambrick’s (1996: 47) work, which demonstrated that, “an 
executive’s tenure in the firm is open to essentially no measurement error”. Furthermore, the 
authors responded to the limitations of the dependence on psychological as matched to 
demographic variables. Finkelstein and Hambrick (1996: 46) also noted that demographic traits are 
more easily obtainable by investigators since top directors are normally reluctant to “submit to 
batteries of psychological tests”. 
 
The decision that institutions make to disclose risk related information necessitates careful 
assessment and consideration of a huge collection of complicate organizational issues. However, 
extending the demographic approach into the field of banks’ risk disclosure practices could lead to 
better understanding of the role of top management teams and their decisions in relation to risk 
disclosure at their banks.  In the following section, the demographic characteristics are explored 
and hypotheses are developed.  
 
Gender  
The presence of woman on the board of publicly listed institutions is becoming of interest to 
researchers (Ellwood and Gracia-Lacalle, 2015). However, one could argue from an agency theory 
viewpoint that gender does not influence the effectiveness of the board of a firm. However, upper 
echelons theory argues that top management demographic characteristics, such as gender, could 
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influence strategic decision-making.  Hence, gender differences might indicate variations in 
behaviour and skills between board members (Allini et al., 2015). Moreover, prior studies have 
generally revealed a mixture of results regarding women directors. Adams and Ferreira (2009) and 
Nielsen and Huse (2010) reported that women on top management teams influence decisions 
positively, while Bianco et al. (2011) strongly question their capacity to impact upon or add extra 
value to the team. In contrast, evidence from previous risk disclosure studies falls into two strands 
of literature.  The first strand found that there is a positive correlation between gender and risk 
disclosure (Ntim et al., 2013; Allini et al., 2015), whereas the second strand reported a negative 
relationship between the two variables (Allini et al., 2014). Therefore, the following hypothesis was 
formulated: 
H9: There is a positive relationship between gender and risk disclosure   
 
Tenure 
Tenure is a significant factor in group procedure within a top management group. On the one hand, 
augmented tenure is related to decreased disagreement, permanence and better communication 
(Kats, 1982). It has also been argued that more tenure time on the board could be linked with 
shared cognitive structures and social cohesion (Michel and Hambrick, 1992). On the other hand, 
it has been argued that top board tenure could have negative outcomes (Keck, 1997) since 
directors working together for extensive periods of time could be inclined to develop similar views 
owing to the long-term acculturation of top team associates, which then results in a shared common 
perspective and corporate paradigm (Pfeffer, 1983). Such effects might result in dysfunctional 
decision-making, generating combined defensive avoidance (Keck, 1997; Janis and Mann, 1977).  
However, due to the ambiguous and difficult nature of risk disclosure decisions, a common 
understanding of the nature of risk disclosure could be fundamental. Therefore, members of the 
top management team with extended tenure could cultivate a more precise shared cognitive 
structure regarding the nature of risk disclosure decisions. Furthermore, extended tenure enables 
board members to better evaluate the surrounding environment of banks’ risk disclosure. Therefore, 
the following hypothesis was formulated: 
H10: There is a positive relationship between tenure of the board and risk disclosure.  
 
Education 
Prior literature has indicated that educational background affects strategic decision making 
procedures and outcomes (Hitt and Tyler, 1991). Moreover, it ensures better monitoring and the 
effectiveness of top management boards in light of agency theory (Allini at al., 2015). Also, it is an 
important determinant in the disclosure exercise (Farook et al., 2011; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002). 
Therefore, Hambrick and Mason (1984) claimed that executives with superior educational 
qualifications are better able to embrace new and innovative actions as well as uncertainty. 
Moreover, educational qualifications could be perceived as an important institutional asset, which 
may influence accounting values and exercises (Gray, 1988). Top executives with a strong 
educational background tend to have superior technical knowledge and a more open-minded 
attitude to risk disclosure decisions, which could lead to the reduction of information asymmetry 
(Domhoff, 1983). However, Guner et al. (2008) stated that there is a dearth of empirical studies on 
the association between board effectiveness and educational background. Only a few studies have 
examined this relationship empirically and revealed the same results. Gul and Leung (2002) and 
Allini et al. (2015) reported a negative association between educational background and risk 
disclosure. Therefore, the following hypothesis has been formulated:  
H11: There is a negative association between educational background of the board and the 
risk disclosure.  
 
Diversity 
Top management team diversity is referred to as the heterogeneity of top executive teams 
regarding age, gender, tenure, educational background, nationality, ethnicity and functional 
background (Williams and O’Reilly, 1998; Simons et al., 1999; Walt and Ingley, 2003; Carter et al., 
2003; Kang et al., 2007; Allini et al., 2015). Moreover, Shaw and Barrett-Power (1998) affirmed that 
diversity is a progressively significant element in institutions, which are becoming more diverse in 
respect of age, nationality, background, gender, ethnicity and other demographic traits. It has also 
 14 
been determined that when disentangling complex, non-routine issues, diverse groups are more 
efficient as they include a collection of personalities with different proficiencies, experience, 
capabilities and viewpoints. It has also been illustrated that boards with diverse membership with 
different abilities make more novel and higher quality decisions than boards with less diverse 
membership (Bantel and Jackson, 1989). The literature shows that numerous variables influence 
the association between diversity and board decision-making (in the case of this study, this could 
be the decision to disclose or withhold any risk information disclosures). Furthermore, risk 
disclosure studies have found that diversity significantly influences risk disclosure (Allini et al., 
2015). Based on the above discussion, the following hypothesis was formulated: 
H12: There is a positive association between diversity of the top management team and the 
degree of risk disclosure 
 
Control variables 
Control variables are incorporated in this study to reduce the influence of the above-stated 
determinants. This study incorporates as control variables two firm-specific variables, size and 
profitability, in line with prior literature (Elshandidy et al., 2013; Ntim et al., 2013; Khlif and 
Hussainey, 2014; Allini et al., 2015; Elshandidy and Neri, 2015). 
Methodology  
This section describes the research design of this investigation, including sample, data collection 
and techniques used to accomplish the aims of this research.  
 
Sample and Data Collection 
The sample consists of the annual reports of all Saudi listed banks over a five-year period. 
Following prior literature on the subject (Lipunga, 2014; Barakat and Hussainey, 2013), this paper 
excluded all non-financial corporations.  Financial institutions are by nature risk-oriented institutions 
unlike non-financial corporations, and therefore their disclosure ought to be considered 
independently (Linsely and Shrives, 2005, 2006; Barakat and Hussainey, 2013). According to the 
Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, there are 12 listed banks on the Saudi exchange market today. 
Unlisted banks in Saudi Arabia are excluded. Therefore, the researcher can state that a total of 12 
listed banks are included in this study. All the annual reports of the selected sample were collected 
from the banks’ homepages, with some of the variables being collected from DataStream and 
Bloomberg. This study covers a five-year period, during which the determinants of risk disclosure 
in the annual reports of listed banks in Saudi Arabia are examined. The selected annual reports 
cover the period from 2009 to 2013.    
Annual reports are used in this investigation because of their wide coverage and availability. This 
study’s focus on annual reports is due to their being the main source of information for shareholders 
as well as their growing use in statements, showing their value to user groups (Elshandidy et al., 
2013; Barakat and Hussainey, 2013; Elshandidy and Neri, 2015). This is concurrent with Marston 
and Shrives (1991), who described them as the “main disclosure vehicle” and argued that annual 
reports are the most complete financial statements accessible to investors. Moreover, Beattie et al. 
(2002) affirmed that annual reports provide comprehensive narratives, information as well as 
explaining accounting figures, sketches and presents perspectives. Also they corroborate 
quantitative measures incorporated in the financial reports (Chugnh and Meador, 1984).  
Content Analysis Approach  
Content analysis has been widely used in social accounting research (Guthrie and Parker, 1989; 
Milne and Adler, 1999; Parker, 2005; Kamla, 2007). These studies analyze the information content 
disclosed in annual reports and acknowledge words and themes within the textual material (Beattie 
et al., 2004; Brennan, 2001). When analysing the content of a written document, words, phrases 
and sentences are coded against a specific schema of interest (Bowman, 1984). Krippendorff 
(1980: 21) described content analysis as “a research technique for making replicable and valid 
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inferences from data”. Furthermore, Bowman (1984) claimed that content analysis enables the 
collection of rich data since it can reveal relationships that other techniques cannot. However, a 
weakness of content analysis is that it is subjective (Linsley and Shrives, 2006). Therefore, 
validation practices are often used to override this problem (Bowman, 1984). 
Risk Disclosure Index Development 
For the purpose of this study, a risk disclosure index, which is a checklist of different disclosure 
items included in banks’ annual reports, was developed (Arvidsson, 2003). During its construction, 
an extensive review of prior investigations was carried out. For an item to be included, it must have 
been used in previous published studies. The risk disclosure index was developed solely for the 
purpose of measuring the amount of risk disclosure in Saudi listed banks. The index included a 
total of 54 items that the researcher expected to be published in the annual reports of the sample 
banks. These 54 items fell into 8 categories: accounting policies, financial and other risks, derivative 
hedging and general risk information, financial instruments, reserves, segment information, 
business risk and compliance. Moreover, one of the important issues during crafting the disclosure 
index was whether or not some items should be weighted more heavily (i.e. given more importance) 
than others. In accounting research, both weighted and un-weighted disclosure indices are utilized 
(Cooke, 1989; Marston and Shrives, 1991; Owusu-Ansah, 1998). For the purpose of this paper, 
the un-weighted disclosure index was chosen because the study does not focus on a particular 
user group (Alsaeed, 2006; Naser et al., 2006). Instead the study addresses all users of annual 
reports and therefore there is no need to confer different importance levels to the disclosed risk 
items (Oliveira et al., 2006). The contents of each bank’s annual reports were compared with the 
items listed in the Appendix and, on the bases of a dichotomous model, they were coded as 1 if 
disclosed or 0 if otherwise. This index coincides with prior literature on disclosure (Barako et al., 
2006; Nazli and Ghazali, 2007; Owusu-Ansah, 1998; Oliveira et al., 2006). 
 
The total score for a bank is: 
 
  TD = ∑ di
n
i=1                                                                   (1) 
Where d = 1 if the item is disclosed; 0 = if the item is not disclosed; n = number of items.  
 
Reliability and Validity Measures  
Weber (1988) argued that the classification procedure should be reliable and valid. The reliability 
and validity of content analysis approaches need to be reviewed carefully. In human-scored 
schemes, reliability, that is the reproducibility of the measurement, is a major concern (Marston and 
Shrives, 1991; Healy and Palepu, 2001). The preceding studies argued that content analysis is not 
reliable if it is conducted only once or only by one specific person (Neuendorf, 2002). Consequently, 
to ensure the content validity of the initial research instrument, it was reviewed independently by 
two other researchers. Subsequently, after the researcher received the independent researcher’s 
comments and suggestions. A fourth experienced academic was required to discuss any 
ambiguities raised. The final disclosure checklist included 54 items. In terms of validity the research 
instrument (disclosure index) is valid if they can measure what they claim to measure (Field, 2009). 
In this study the index has measure what it claimed to measure; therefore the researcher can safely 
claim that the research instrument is valid. To ensure the reliability of the research instrument, the 
author and the two independent researchers scored three randomly selected banks. Then, the 
results from the three researchers were compared. Given that the final research disclosure index 
was agreed by all researchers, differences in the compliance scores from the researchers were 
insignificant. This method was adopted by Marston and Shrives (1991), who argued that the index 
scores awarded to firm could be considered reliable if other researchers could replicate the same 
results.   
 
Regression Model 
This study uses the following ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model to examine the 
relationship between risk disclosure in the annual reports and both corporate governance 
mechanisms and demographic traits in Saudi listed banks: 
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RISKD it= β0+β1CHS+β2 NOCH-FACTORS+β3 BSIZE+β4 
INDEP+β5 NON+β6 ACINDEP+β7 ACSIZE+β8 ACMEET+β9 EDUC+β10 TENU 
+β11 GENDER+ β12 DIVERSITY β13 SIZE+ β14 PROF +ɛ                     (2) 
Where: RISKD = risk disclosure score  
β0 = the intercept  
Β1….. β14 = regression coefficients (See table 1 for explanation) 
 ɛ = error term  
I = Bank  
T = Year 
 
Dependent variable: risk disclosure score. Following prior studies (Linsley and Shrives, 2006; 
Elzahar and Hussainey, 2012; Abdullah et al., 2015), content analysis was used to measure the 
level of risk disclosure in the annual reports. The number of risk-related words was used as a 
measure of risk disclosure levels.  
Independent variables: To examine the determinants of risk disclosure, corporate governance and 
demographic traits, information was collected from different sources. Table I summarizes the 
measurement and definition of those variables. 
Table 1: Summary of variable names, description and sources 
Abbreviated name Full name Variable description 
Predicted 
Sign 
Data source 
Dependent variables 
RISKD Risk disclosure  Risk disclosure level based on risk 
index  
 Annual reports 
Independent variables 
1. Corporate Governance characteristics   
BSIZE Board size Number of board members + Annual report 
CHS Internal Ownership Percentage of shares held by 
internal shareholders 
- DataStream 
NOCH-Factor  External Ownership  Percentage of shares held by 
external shareholders  
+ DataStream 
INDEP Independent directors Number of non-executive 
directors  on the board of directors 
+ Bloomberg 
Annual Report 
NON Non-executive 
directors 
Dummy variable 1 if board 
contains non-executive directors 
and otherwise 0. 
+ Bloomberg 
Annual Report  
ACINDEP Audit committee 
independence  
Proportion of non-executive 
director on board. 
+ Bloomberg 
Annual Report 
ACSIZE Audit committee size Number of audit committee 
members 
+ Annual report 
ACMEET Audit committee 
meetings 
Number of audit committee 
meetings 
+ Annual report 
2. Demographic characteristics 
EDUC Education Dummy variable 1 if one of the 
board members holds a PhD 
period and otherwise 0. 
+ Annual report 
TENU Tenure Dummy variable 1 if the number 
of years the board member 
permanence on the board is above 
the sample median of 5 years, 
otherwise 0.  
+ Annual report 
GENDER Gender Dummy variable 1 if board 
contains female directors and 
otherwise 0. 
+ Annual report 
DIVE Diversity  Dummy variable 1 if board 
contains more than one nationality 
and otherwise 0. 
+ Annual report 
3. Firm-specific characteristics (Control Variables) 
SIZE Bank size Natural logarithm of total assets + DataStream 
PROF Profitability ROA (Return On Assets) + DataStream  
LEV Leverage Long-term debt/ total assets   + DataStream  
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LIQ Liquidity Current Ratio: Current 
Assets/Current Liabilities 
+ Annual report 
DIVID Dividend payout Dividends per share  + DataStream 
This table provides the description and measures of risk disclosure reporting, as dependent variables, and firm characteristics, 
corporate governance mechanism and demographic traits as independent variables. It also provides the source of each variable. 
 
Empirical analysis  
Descriptive analysis 
Table 2 shows the main descriptive statistics for the corporate governance variables and the 
demographic traits used in the analysis of the sample banks in this investigation. It shows the 
minimum, maximum, statistical mean and the standard deviation. Firstly, it shows that the mean 
total risk disclosure is 66.03%. It also shows that there is a large variation in risk reporting between 
the sampled banks, with a minimum of 51% and a maximum of 78%. It also shows that the mean 
of CHS holdings is 19% and the mean of NOCH-Factor ownership is 29.5%, while the mean board 
size is 10 directors, with a mean of 7 members of the board in the sample banks consisting of non-
executive directors. Furthermore, the table shows that the independent directors mean is 5, with a 
minimum of 3 and a maximum of 8 independent directors. Secondly, the audit committee (AC) 
independence mean is 75, whereas the audit committee size ranges from 2 to 5 directors, with a 
mean of 3. There is also a large variation in the number of AC meetings between the sample banks, 
with a minimum of 3 meetings, a maximum of 11 and a mean of 5. Finally, this table also shows 
the demographic traits of the top management teams included in the descriptive analysis, which 
are gender, tenure, education and diversity. It is also important to note that all of these variables 
have been treated as a dummy variable (1-0).  Where gender scored an overall mean of .08, tenure 
of the top board of directors scored a total mean of .6, while education scored a total mean of .7 
and diversity scored a total mean of .3 in the entire sample of this investigation. 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics  
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
RISKD 60 .51 .78 .6603 .07059 
CHS 60 0.00 69.00 19.1000 17.46056 
NOCH-Factor 60 25.00 45.00 29.5000 5.08091 
BSIZE 60 7.00 11.00 9.5500 .94645 
INDEP 60 3.00 8.00 5.1333 1.62049 
NON 60 1 11 7.37 2.718 
ACINDEP 60 0.00 1.00 .7500 .43667 
ACSIZE 60 2.00 5.00 3.7667 .96316 
ACMEET 60 3.00 11.00 5.3667 1.95688 
GENDER 60 0.00 1.00 .0833 .27872 
TENU 60 0.00 1.00 .6000 .49403 
EDUC 60 0.00 1.00 .7000 .46212 
DIVE 60 0.00 1.00 .3333 .47538 
SIZE 60 7.24 8.58 7.9940 .35203 
PROF 60 -.01 .04 .0192 .00869 
Valid N (listwise) 60         
This table presents the descriptive analysis for the corporate governance variables and the demographic traits used in the regression model for 
the sample banks in this investigation. RISKD: Risk disclosure score (based on an unweighted disclosure index); CHS: Internal ownership 
(Percentage of shares held by internal shareholders); NOCH-Factor: External ownership (Percentage of shares held by all external 
shareholders); BSIZE: Board size (Number of board members); INDEP: Independent directors (Number of non-executive directors  on the 
board of directors); NON: Non-executive directors (Dummy variable 1 if board contains non-executive directors and otherwise 0); ACINDEP: 
Audit committee independence (Dummy variable; 1 if audit committee independence exists, and 0 otherwise); ACSIZE: Audit committee size 
(Number of audit committee members); ACMEET: Audit committee meetings (Number of audit committee meetings); GENDER: Gender 
(Number of females on the board); TENU: Tenure (Dummy variable 1 if the number of years the board member permanence on the board is 
above the sample median of 5 years, otherwise 0); EDUC: Education (Number of board members holding a PhD); DIVE: Diversity (Number 
of other nationalities of the board ); SIZE: Bank size (Natural logarithm of total assets); PROF: Profitability (Return On Assets)  
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Regression analysis  
The analysis of the risk disclosure of Saudi listed banks and their determinants led to some concrete 
results since six of the independent variables, namely Noch-Factors, board size, audit committee 
meetings, gender, size and profitability, are the main variables directing risk disclosure decisions 
in Saudi listed banks. The summary table below demonstrates that the R square and adjusted R 
square are high for the study under consideration, where both R square and adjusted R square are 
high at .706 and .576, respectively, supporting the explanatory power of the model. The Durbin-
Watson test confirmed that there is no autocorrelation problem with the data. Moreover, the ANOVA 
table below indicates that the model is significant, with an F value of 5.458, confirming the fitness 
of the model used for the purpose of this study. 
Table 3: Pearson correlation Matrix 
 RISKD CHS 
NOCH-
Factor 
BSIZE INDEP NON ACINDEP ACSIZE ACMEET GENDER TENU EDUC DIVE SIZE ROA 
RISKD 1 -.129 .411** -.107 -.171 -.095 .074 .136 .054 .093 -.356** -.241 .375** .479** .271* 
CHS -.129 1 -.492** .364** .195 .290* -.190 .243 .196 .061 .195 -.059 -.261* .006 .329* 
NOCH-
Factor 
.411** -.492** 1 .073 -.248 -.308* .325* -.062 .153 -.215 -.218 -.173 .547** .071 -.227 
BSIZE -.107 .364
** .073 1 -.038 .467** -.072 .013 .566** .016 .007 -.081 .226 .101 .283* 
INDEP -.171 .195 -.248 -.038 1 .439** .335** .335** .075 .050 .110 .326* -.169 -.478** -.172 
NON -.095 .290
* -.308* .467** .439** 1 .050 .454** .459** .138 -.103 .251 .114 -.052 .200 
ACINDE
P 
.074 -.190 .325* -.072 .335** .050 1 .141 -.089 .174 -.079 .294* .408** -.225 -.279* 
ACSIZE .136 .243 -.062 .013 .335** .454** .141 1 .190 -.242 .121 -.046 -.086 .019 .219 
ACMEE
T 
.054 .196 .153 .566** .075 .459** -.089 .190 1 -.212 .014 .030 -.024 -.055 .158 
GENDE
R 
.093 .061 -.215 .016 .050 .138 .174 -.242 -.212 1 -.246 .197 .426** -.166 -.181 
TENU -.356** .195 -.218 .007 .110 -.103 -.079 .121 .014 -.246 1 .134 -.433** -.126 .039 
EDUC -.241 -.059 -.173 -.081 .326* .251 .294* -.046 .030 .197 .134 1 .077 -.211 -.148 
DIVE .375** -.261* .547** .226 -.169 .114 .408** -.086 -.024 .426** -.433** .077 1 .112 -.055 
SIZE .479** .006 .071 .101 -.478** -.052 -.225 .019 -.055 -.166 -.126 -.211 .112 1 .529** 
PROF .271* .329* -.227 .283* -.172 .200 -.279* .219 .158 -.181 .039 -.148 -.055 .529** 1 
This table presents the correlation matrix for the corporate governance variables and the demographic traits used in the regression model for the sample banks in this 
investigation. RISKD: Risk disclosure score (based on an un-weighted disclosure index, where equal weights were attached to all reported items within the checklist. Hence 
if an item is reported in the annual report of the bank scores “1” and if otherwise it scores “0”); CHS: Internal ownership (Percentage of shares held by internal shareholders); 
NOCH-Factor: External ownership (Percentage of shares held by all external shareholders); BSIZE: Board size (Number of board members); INDEP: Independent directors 
(Number of non-executive directors  on the board of directors); NON: Non-executive directors (Dummy variable 1 if board contains non-executive directors and otherwise 0); 
ACINDEP: Audit committee independence (Dummy variable; 1 if audit committee independence exists, and 0 otherwise); ACSIZE: Audit committee size (Number of audit 
committee members); ACMEET: Audit committee meetings (Number of audit committee meetings); GENDER: Gender (Number of females on the board); TENU: Tenure 
(Dummy variable 1 if the number of years the board member permanence on the board is above the sample median of 5 years, otherwise 0); EDUC: Education (Number of 
board members holding a PhD); DIVE: Diversity (Number of other nationalities of the board ); SIZE: Bank size (Natural logarithm of total assets); PROF: Profitability (Return 
On Assets). Note that ** and * indicate that there is a correlation significant at the 0.01 and at the 0.05 between the respective factors respectively.  
 
Table 3, the Pearson correlation matrix is deployed to measure the strength and the direction of 
the linear relationship between any two variables. The results above in the correlation coefficient 
demonstrate positive a significant correlation between voluntary risk disclosure and NOCH-Factor 
at a value of .411**. They also show the same relationship between diversity at a value of .375**, 
size at 479**, profitability at .271* and risk disclosure. Moreover, the correlation matrix indicates a 
negatively significant association between tenure at a value of -.356** and voluntary risk disclosure. 
However, the table shows that the highest correlation was between bank size and voluntary risk 
disclosure at .479. Table 4 shows that there are insignificant associations between CHS, board 
size, independent directors, non-executive directors, audit committee independence, audit 
committee size, audit committee meetings, gender, tenure and education with voluntary risk 
disclosure in Saudi listed banks.  
Table 4: Regression results for the corporate governance and the demographic variables 
 
Unstandardized coefficients 
 t Sig. VIF 
B Std. Error 
(Constant) -0.135 0.230 -0.590 0.558  
CHS -0.000006660 0.001 -0.101 0.920 3.675 
NOCH-Factor +0.007 0.003 2.584 0.013 5.995 
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BOARDSIZE -0.032 0.011 -2.911 0.006 3.070 
INDEP 0.010 0.006 1.582 0.121 3.098 
NON -0.003 0.005 -0.507 0.615 5.347 
ACINDEP -0.007  0.020 -0.332 0.742 2.170 
ACSIZE 0.010 0.009 1.031 0.309 2.325 
ACMEET +0.012 0.005 2.276 0.028 2.764 
GENDER +0.117 0.034 3.406 0.001 2.571 
TENURE -0.024 0.016 -1.485 0.145 1.766 
EDUCATION -0.022 0.016 -1.338 0.188 1.579 
DIVERSITY -0.005 0.028 -0.161 0.873 5.105 
SIZE +0.094 0.024 3.922 0.000 1.982 
PROF +2.644 1.047 2.525 0.016 2.316 
Model Summary  
Adjusted R square: 0 .576 
F value: 5.458 
Sig. 0.000 
This table presents the regression results for the corporate governance variables and the demographic traits used in the regression 
model for the sample banks in this investigation. RISKD: Risk disclosure score (based on an un-weighted disclosure index, where 
equal weights were attached to all reported items within the checklist. Hence if an item is reported in the annual report of the bank 
scores “1” and if otherwise it scores “0”); CHS: Internal ownership (Percentage of shares held by internal shareholders); NOCH-
Factor: External ownership (Percentage of shares held by all external shareholders); BSIZE: Board size (Number of board members); 
INDEP: Independent directors (Number of non-executive directors  on the board of directors); NON: Non-executive directors 
(Dummy variable 1 if board contains non-executive directors and otherwise 0); ACINDEP: Audit committee independence (Dummy 
variable; 1 if audit committee independence exists, and 0 otherwise); ACSIZE: Audit committee size (Number of audit committee 
members); ACMEET: Audit committee meetings (Number of audit committee meetings); GENDER: Gender (Number of females on 
the board); TENU: Tenure (1 if the number of years the board member permanence on the board is above the sample median of 5 
years, otherwise 0); EDUC: Education (Number of board members holding a PhD); DIVE: Diversity (Number of other nationalities 
of the board ); SIZE: Bank size (Natural logarithm of total assets); PROF: Profitability (Return On Assets). Note that “+” indicates 
that there is a positive correlation or a proof of influence exists between the respective factors and “-“indicates that there is a negative 
correlation or proof. 
 
This study uses OLS regression analysis to examine the determinants of voluntary risk disclosure 
in Saudi listed banks. The coefficients table above demonstrates the interrelationships between the 
voluntary risk disclosure score as the dependent variable and a number of other variables as 
independents. Thus, before conducting the regression analysis, multicollinearity was tested by 
employing the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) to detect any noises in the model. When carried out 
for the purpose of this investigation, this statistical test gave no indication of multicollinearity 
problems as shown in the table above. Since the VIF did not exceed 10 for any variable in any 
model, it was concluded that collinearity was not a serious problem (Neter et al., 1983; Naser et al., 
2006). Moreover, it can be seen from the regression results table above that there is a positive 
significant relationship between NOCH-Factor, audit committee meetings, gender, size, profitability 
and voluntary risk disclosure. The coefficients on the variables are positive and statistically 
significant at .05, .05, .01, .01 and .05, respectively. Also, the table shows that there is a negatively 
significant association between board size and voluntary risk disclosure, with a coefficient value 
of .01, while the rest of the independent variables of both corporate governance mechanisms and 
demographic traits are insignificantly correlated with voluntary risk disclosure in Saudi Arabia.        
Discussion   
This investigation found that ownership structure has a significant effect on voluntary risk disclosure. 
These findings are in line with prior empirical results that indicate banks with lower insider 
ownership (proxied by CHS) are not inclined to provide higher voluntary risk disclosure, whereas 
banks with higher outsider ownership (proxied by NOSH-Factor) are more prone to provide 
considerably higher levels of voluntary risk disclosure (Elshandidy et al., 2013; Abraham and Cox, 
2007). Also, these results are in line with both agency theory and signalling theory, which propose 
that directors are only driven to offer higher levels of voluntary risk disclosure when there is a widely 
dispersed ownership structure to mitigate information asymmetries owing to external pressure 
(Mohobbot, 2005; Owusu-Ansah, 1998), implying that H1 and 2 are empirically supported. Also, 
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the coefficient on audit committee meetings is .012 and is significant at .05 significance level. These 
findings show that banks with more frequent audit committee meetings are more motivated to 
disclose more risk information. These results are consistent with prior empirical findings 
(Karamanou and Vafeas 2005; Allegrini and Greco, 2013). Also, this outcome is consistent with 
agency theory, whereby internal and external monitoring practices complement each other in 
reducing agency conflicts and information asymmetry between different types of stockholders, 
implying that H8 is empirically supported. However, our results show that there is a negatively 
significant association between board size and voluntary risk disclosure, with a coefficient value at 
-.032 and significance at the .01 percent level. This is in line with some preceding research (Jia et 
al., 2009; Guest, 2009; Coles et al., 2008) as well as being concurrent with agency theory, which 
suggests that bigger boards are bad and corrupt (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) owing to free rider 
problems, such as expanded decision making time, raised costs, poor communication and 
monitoring practices, which impact negatively on board performance in general and risk disclosure 
in particular. Therefore, we reject H3. Yet, the other corporate governance variables (CHS, INDEP, 
NON, ACINDEP and ACSIZE) are found to have an insignificant correlation with voluntary risk 
disclosure in Saudi listed banks.    
In terms of demographic characteristics, table 4 shows that banks with women on the top 
management board are more likely to disclose voluntary risk disclosure. The coefficient on gender 
is .117 and is significant at the .01 significance level. This effect is consistent with the previous 
empirical findings of Ntim et al. (2013) and Allini et al. (2015). Also, Adams and Ferreira (2009) and 
Nielsen and Huse (2010) reported that women on top management teams influence decisions 
positively. Moreover, this is consistent with upper echelons theory, which proposes that top 
management demographic characteristics, such as gender, could influence strategic decision-
making, implying that H9 is empirically supported. Our findings do not support demographic traits 
(TENU, EDUC and DIVE) having a significant relationship with voluntary risk disclosure is Saudi 
Arabian listed banks.   
Additionally, for the control variables, our findings report that size is correlated positively with 
voluntary risk disclosure at a .01 significance level. This relationship is consistent with a number of 
prior empirical investigations (Khlif and Hussainey, 2014; Elzahar and Hussainey, 2012; Abraham 
and Cox, 2007; Linsley and Shrives, 2006). This relationship confirms that directors of bigger banks 
are more motivated to convey risk information to investors to differentiate their institution from 
smaller ones (Khlif and Hussainey, 2014). This association is also consistent with both agency 
theory and signalling theory, which advocate that bigger institutions lean towards reporting more 
risk information to reduce agency costs and information asymmetry between insider and outsiders. 
Furthermore, the coefficient on profitability is 2.644 and is significant at a .05 percentage level. This 
effect is consistent with prior literature that examined profitability in relation to risk disclosure and 
observed the same findings (Deumes and Knechel 2008; Miihkinen, 2012; Khlif and Hussainey, 
2014). This association between profitability and risk disclosure is also consistent with signalling 
theory. Helbok and Wagner (2006) and Linsely et al. (2006) confirmed that banks with superior risk 
management techniques tend to have greater levels of profitability, and hence directors have 
greater incentives to signal their performance and their capacity to manage risk successfully.  
 Conclusion 
This investigation sought to empirically examine the impact of corporate governance and top team 
demographic traits on the levels of voluntary risk disclosure practices and to identify the 
determinants of voluntary risk disclosure practices in all Saudi listed banks from 2009 to 2013. The 
empirical findings show that banks of large size, high outsider ownership, high profitability, high 
regularity of audit committee meetings and mixed gender on the top management board of directors 
are more likely to demonstrate higher levels of voluntary risk disclosure practices. Also, the level of 
voluntary risk disclosure is negatively affected by board size. Moreover, as can be seen from the 
empirical findings of this investigation, external ownership, audit committee meetings, gender, size, 
profitability and board size are primary determinants of voluntary risk disclosure practices in listed 
banks on the Saudi Exchange Stock Market (Tadawul), while the rest of the independent variables 
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of both corporate governance mechanisms and demographic traits are insignificantly correlated 
with the levels of voluntary risk disclosure practices in Saudi Arabian listed banks.  
Our findings have several important implications, by informing banks’ stockholders, regulatory 
bodies and any other interested groups about the importance of corporate governance and 
demographic determinants, which can be used to augment voluntary risk reporting in the banking 
industry in an effort to ensure information adequacy and increased market efficiency. The reported 
findings should be useful to accounting and risk regulators by providing information about the 
inadequacies of risk disclosure in Saudi and a more complete picture of risk components and 
determinants in listed banks. While this study does not explore the risk profiles of Islamic banks 
directly, the results somehow propose that Islamic banks are more likely to be risk-averse than their 
non-Islamic counterparts suggesting a worthy field for future research. These implications could 
extend to the governance, board demography and risk disclosure literature by theoretically 
justifying and empirically investigating the implications of such determinants and theories in regards 
to voluntary risk disclosure in the banking sector. This focus is significant because it provides 
insights into the determinants of voluntary risk disclosure in banks that operate in an environment 
regarded as being invariably opaque.  
This study was limited to the employment of the annual report as this was regarded as the most 
important means of communication. Other available means in Saudi Arabia, such as interim reports, 
prospectuses, press releases and the Internet were not reflected in this study despite the possibility 
of them impacting upon the decision-making processes. These means could provide significant 
data for future research on risk disclosure. Such results could determine similarities and differences 
across both means of the data sources. Another limitation is that this investigation only focused on 
a single setting, Saudi Arabia. An extension of this investigation may be to compare voluntary risk 
disclosure in other emerging markets in the Middle East. Such investigation would offer valuable 
insights into the literature on disclosure. In spite of the noted limitations, the study did offer important 
insights into the determinants of voluntary risk disclosure in Saudi Arabia. 
This study suggests a number of other venues for future research. Firstly, research could extend 
over a longer period of time. Secondly, this study could be extended by conducting comparative 
studies with other countries, preferably in the Middle Eastern countries due to similarities in the 
settings in order to explore any differences in the determinants of risk disclosure across such 
countries. Thirdly, little is known about the traits of the top managers and top management teams 
of Saudi corporations and how their psychological and sociological attributes impact the voluntary 
risk disclosure practices of the organisations they manage. Additional research could also be 
undertaken to study the economic consequences of risk disclosure practices in annual reports (for 
example, the effect on prices leading earnings, cost of capital, analyst following, firm value and the 
characteristics of analysts' forecasts).  
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